Intellectual Property Survey by Woods, Maria V.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 70 
Issue 4 Tenth Circuit Surveys Article 14 
January 2021 
Intellectual Property Survey 
Maria V. Woods 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Maria V. Woods, Intellectual Property Survey, 70 Denv. U. L. Rev. 787 (1993). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SURVEY
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit addressed the modem intel-
lectual property rights of trade dress, patent reexaminations and unique
copyright damages during 1992. First, the Supreme Court streamlined
the test for trade dress protection in deciding its first substantive trade
dress case. Second, after Congress developed an additional patent chal-
lenge proceeding, the Tenth Circuit enumerated duties this new proce-
dure requires. Third, the Tenth Circuit awarded the unique copyright
damages of research and development costs for copyright infringement.
This survey addresses the Tenth Circuit's approach to these three areas
of intellectual property.
II. TRADE DRESS: SECONDARY MEANING NOT REQUIRED IF INHERENTLY
DISTINCTIVE
Trade dress refers to the overall image of a product, its packaging
and the manufacturer's choice of visual design. Federal courts of appeal
disagreed as to the proper test allowing protection for trade dress. The
Supreme Court in its first decision concerning this exploding new area
of law' clarified that test. In doing so the Court placed the developing
law of trade dress squarely within the well-established law of trademarks
despite their differences.
A. Background
Historically, trade dress infringement claims developed under fed-
eral trademark and unfair competition law.2 The conduct controlled by
the two areas differs more in degree than in kind.3 Under unfair compe-
tition, the total image creating consumer confusion must be modified
upon a finding of infringement. 4 In contrast, under trademark law a
court focuses on the discrete elements of plaintiff's marketing image. 5
The Lanham Act was the first major step toward substantive federal
trademark and unfair competition legislation in the United States. 6 The
Act defines a trademark as any word, name, symbol, or device, or combi-
nation used to identify and distinguish a person's goods and to indicate
the source of such goods.7 A trademark can only be registered if it dis-
1. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992).
2. Scott H. Culley & Ezekiel J. Williams, Trade Dress: An Overview and Tenth Circuit
Survey, TRIAL TALK, July/Aug., 1992, at 181.
3. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DocrRINES
55 (3d ed. 1990).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Culley & Williams, supra note 2, at 181.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988).
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tinguishes the applicant's goods from those in commerce.
8
Registration affords the trademark owner several rights. First, it
provides constructive notice of ownership,9 thereby preventing subse-
quent people from acquiring any right to use that mark. 10 Second, any
person using the same mark before registration has some rights against
the registered owner but only in the specific territory the user occupied
at the time of registration."l Third, after five consecutive years, a regis-
tered mark becomes immune from cancellation 12 and becomes incon-
testable.' 3 Fourth, registration grants the owner an exclusive right to
use the mark and establishes prima facie validity of the mark in any court
proceeding.14 Remedies are provided to protect the registrant of a reg-
istered mark including: (1) injunctive relief;15 (2) recovery of profits,
damages, costs and attorney fees; 16 and (3) destruction of the infringing
articles. 17
Registering a trademark requires a demonstration of the mark's dis-
tinctiveness and use in commerce. The former ensures that the mark
identifies a single source of goods. 18 Judge Friendly articulated four
well-accepted categories of distinctiveness: (1) generic; (2) descriptive;
(3) suggestive; and (4) arbitrary or fanciful. 19 A generic term, such as
"soap" or "bandage," cannot become a trademark under any circum-
stances. 20 Descriptive marks only describe the product such as "aloe
soap" or "adhesive bandage." Descriptive marks are not distinct by def-
inition, but must acquire distinctiveness through secondary meaning.
2 1
Secondary meaning occurs when a capacity to identify goods to a single
source develops. Suggestive marks require a product's name to create
an inference concerning the type of goods it represents. 2 2 An example
is "Ivory Soap." 23 An inference exists between the color ivory and the
purity of the soap. Fanciful and arbitray marks do not relate to the
goods, such as "Dial Soap" or "Cutex Bandages." These marks never
need a demonstration of secondary meaning to gain protection.
24
The legal recognition of an inherently distinctive trademark or
trade dress grants the owner a proprietary interest in this valuable infor-
mation device even if no substantial consumer association has oc-
8. Id. § 1052.
9. Id. § 1072.
10. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 296.
11. Id.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1988).
13. Id. § 1065.
14. Id. § 1115.
15. Id. § 1116.
16. Id. § 1117.
17. Id. § 1118.
18. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 203, 223.
19. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).







curred.2 5 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides statutory protection
for trade dress infringement claims.2 6 Courts define trade dress as the
total image of a product and include features such as size, shape, color,
color combinations, texture and graphics.2 7 Examples include the well-
known configuration of a whiskey pinch bottle2 8 or the distinct look of a
greeting card. 29 The statute provides recovery for a party injured by a
competitor's "false designation of origin, false or misleading description
of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact" in regard to its
product.3 0 Section 43(a) does not contain registration instructions un-
like the section pertaining to trademarks. Claims typically arise out of
misleading packaging or trade dress. 3 ' Generally, the plaintiff must es-
tablish: (1) nonfunctionality; (2) a likelihood of consumer confusion;
and (3) secondary meaning.3 2 The Supreme Court requires a showing
of secondary meaning only if the trade dress is not inherently distinc-
tive3 3-thereby paralleling the trade dress test with trademark law even
though Section 43(a) does not contain a distinctiveness requirement.
1. The Trade Dress Test
Courts first determine if trade dress is functional or nonfunctional
in nature. Trade dress protects nonfunctional or ornamental configura-
tions of a product's package, but not functional or utilitarian features.
3 4
Nonfunctional features include, for example, a style of a greeting
card,35 a fishing reel cover,3 6 the visual impression of a restaurant3 7 and
a pinch whiskey bottle.3 8 The determination of functional features has
proved difficult for courts to make in a uniform fashion.3 9 The Second
25. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753, 2761 (1992).
26. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 354.
27. AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1535 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1041 (1987).
28. Ex parte Haig & Haig Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229, 230 (1958).
29. Hartford House Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988).
30. The section provides:
(a) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact ... shall be liable
in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be
damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1988).
31. Dawn R. Duven, Comment, The Present Scope of Recovery for Unfair Competition Viola-
tions Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 58 NEB. L. REV. 159, 165 (1978).
32. Hartford House, 846 F.2d at 1271.
33. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992).
34. Culley & Williams, supra note 2, at 181. But see Jessica Litman, Note, The Problem of
Functional Features: Trade Dress Infringement Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 77, 80 (1982) (discussing how the functionality doctrine was improperly imported
from the common law doctrine of unfair competition and should not be used in deciding
trade dress infringement).
35. Hartford House, 846 F.2d at 1268.
36. Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1987).
37. Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1987).
38. Exparte Haig & Haig Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229 (1958).
39. Culley & Williams, supra note 2, at 181.
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Circuit claims a functional feature must be essential to the use or pur-
pose of the article, or affect the cost or quality.40 The Fifth Circuit de-
fines functionality as a feature of an article superior or optimal in terms
of engineering, economy of manufacture or accommodation of utilita-
rian function or performance; 4 1 the Seventh Circuit defines functionality
as a feature shared by different brands that is costly not to have;42 and
the Tenth Circuit defines it as the feature creating a monopoly which
would prevent others from successfully competing. 43
Next, a plaintiff must show "likelihood of consumer confusion," the
main purpose of the Lanham Act.44 In determining consumer confu-
sion, the Tenth Circuit adopted the factors listed in the Restatement of
Torts.4 5 These factors include: (1) the degree of similarity between
designation and the trade dress; (2) appearance; (3) suggestions; (4) in-
tent of the party in adopting the designation; and (5) the relation in use
and manner of marketing between goods marketed by the party and
those marketed by another. 46 The plaintiff does not need to show actual
consumer confusion but it may be the strongest evidence to support
such a determination.
4 7
Finally, trade dress traditionally required a demonstration of secon-
dary meaning. A label or package has secondary meaning when a con-
sumer associates it with a certain producer and will make the same
association when another uses a similar label or package design.48 The
public need not know the identity of the manufacturer, only that the
product comes from a single but anonymous source.4 9
A plaintiff proves secondary meaning with either direct or circum-
stantial evidence. One commentator has stated that "[djirect evidence
consists of the testimony of consumers as to their states of mind at the
time they purchased the product."' 50 A plaintiff establishes circumstan-
tial evidence by demonstrating the seller's efforts in advertising the
product to a wide group of potential purchasers. 5 1 In Two Pesos, Inc. v.
Taco Cabana, Inc., the Supreme Court eliminated the need to demon-
40. Beth F. Dumas, The Functionality Doctrine in Trade Dress and Copyright Infringement
Actions: A Callfor Clarification, 12 HASTINGS COMM. & ENr. L.J. 471, 480 (1990).
41. Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 429 (5th Cir. 1984).
42. Service Ideas, Inc. v. Traex Corp., 846 F.2d 1118, 1123 (7th Cir. 1988).
43. Hartford House, Ltd v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988); Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 519 (10th
Cir. 1987).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988). See Michael J. Alien, The Scope of Confusion Actionable Under
Federal Trademark Law: Who Must Be Confused and When?, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 321
(1991).
45. Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 925 (10th Cir. 1986); See
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 729 (1938).
46. Beer Nuts, 805 F.2d at 925. These factors are not comprehensive.
47. Brunswick, 832 F.2d at 521.
48. Litman, supra note 34, at 80.
49. Culley & Williams, supra note 2, at 184.
50. Timothy R.M. Bryant, Comment, Trademark Infringement: The Irrelevance of Evidence
of Copying to Secondary Meaning, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 473, 485 (1989).
51. Id. at 486.
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strate secondary meaning for inherently distinctive trade dress.5 2
2. Conflict Among the Circuits as to Secondary Meaning
Until 1992, a conflict existed between the circuits as to whether
trade dress infringement required actual proof of secondary meaning.
The Second Circuit, most notably, demanded evidence of secondary
meaning before granting trade dress protection.5 3 In Vibrant Sales, Inc.
v. New Body Boutique, Inc. ,54 the Second Circuit relied on a presumption
that registered marks indicate the source of the product whereas unreg-
istered marks do not, absent a showing of secondary meaning. 55 The
Fifth Circuit, however, followed Judge Friendly's test from Abercrombie,
56
and did not require a showing of secondary meaning when the trade
dress was inherently distinctive. 5 7 The Eleventh5 8 Circuit also agreed
with Judge Friendly's approach.
Until Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,59 the circuits received little
guidance from the Supreme Court. Only two Supreme Court cases had
even mentioned the concept of trade dress and neither contained much
discussion on the matter. The Court hinted at the possibility of recovery
for infringement of trade dress in Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc. 60 and
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.6 1 In Inwood Lab., the Court
only acknowledged that trade dress protection may exist and remanded
to the court of appeals to determine the infringement claim. 6 2 The
Court recognized trade dress protection in Bonito Boats, but in a design
patent context. 63 The Court ignored an early chance to establish a uni-
form trade dress test among the federal circuits.
52. 112 S. ct. 2753 (1992).
53. Industria Arredamenti Fratelli Saporiti v. Charles Craig, Ltd. 725 F.2d 18, 19 (2d
Cir. 1984); see also American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136,
1141 (3d Cir. 1986); Prufrock Ltd., Inc. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 132 (8th Cir. 1986);
Kwik-Site Corp. v. Clear View Mfg. Co., Inc., 758 F.2d 167, 178 (6th Cir. 1985); Keebler
Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 378 (1st Cir. 1980).
54. 652 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982).
55. Id. at 304. After its decision in Vibrant, the Second Circuit announced it would
follow the classification of marks set out by Judge Friendly in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v.
Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 7 (2d Cir. 1976); Thompson Medical Co. v. Pfizer, Inc.,
753 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1985). Regardless of this decision, the court still continued to deny
trade dress protection absent proof of secondary meaning. See LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart
Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1985).
56. 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
57. Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 702-
03 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982).
58. AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 805 F.2d 974,979 (11 th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1041 (1987).
59. 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992).
60. 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
61. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
62. 456 U.S. at 858-59.
63. 489 U.S. at 154.
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3. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Toco Cabana, Inc.6 4
a. Facts
Taco Cabana, Inc. operated a chain of fast food restaurants in
Texas. 65 The restaurant first opened in San Antonio in September of
1978, expanding to five additional San Antonio sites in 1985 and the
Houston and Austin markets by 1986.66 Taco Cabana described its
Mexican trade dress as a festive atmosphere having interior dining and
patio areas decorated with bright neon colors, paintings, murals, and
artifacts. The stepped exterior of the building had a vivid color scheme
using top border paints and neon stripes. Bright awnings and umbrellas
continued the theme 67 In December, 1985, Two Pesos opened a res-
taurant in Houston with a very similar Mexican motif.68 Taco Cabana
sued Two Pesos for trade dress infringement under section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act.
6 9
The trial court instructed the jury that Taco Cabana's trade dress
was protected if either it was inherently distinctive or had acquired sec-
ondary meaning. 70 Thejury found that: (1) Taco Cabana had an inher-
ently distinctive trade dress; (2) the trade dress had not acquired
secondary meaning in the Texas market; and (3) the alleged infringe-
ment created a likelihood of confusion on the part of the ordinary cus-
tomer. 7 ' In the course of calculating damages, the trial court held that
Two Pesos intentionally and deliberately infringed on Taco Cabana's
trade dress.
72
The Fifth Circuit ruled that the instructions adequately stated the
applicable law and that the evidence supported the jury's findings. The
court rejected Two Pesos' argument that a finding of no secondary
meaning contradicted a finding of inherent distinctiveness.
73
b. Supreme Court's Majority Opinion
Justice White, writing for the majority, affirmed the Fifth Circuit
opinion by drawing parallels from the well-established trademark
field. 7 4 The decision analyzed the trade dress issue specifically relying
on the categorization of trademarks described by Judge Friendly.75 The
Court found no persuasive reason why the analysis of trademark and
trade dress should differ.
76
64. 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992).
65. Id. at 2755.
66. Id. at 2755-56.
67. Id. at 2755
68. Id.




73. Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1120 (5th Cir. 1991).
74. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2760.
75. Id. at 2757.
76. Id. at 2760.
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The Court rejected Two Pesos's argument that trade dress should
have only temporary protection and be subject to defeasance if failing to
acquire secondary meaning. 77 The Court stated that if a mark is inher-
ently distinctive, the failure of it obtaining secondary meaning does not
remove this distinctiveness. Instead, the fact that the public does not
associate a product with a source indicates the failure of a business to be
successful in the marketplace.
78
The majority analyzed the conflict in the federal courts of appeal
and concluded that the Fifth Circuit's test that did not require secondary
meaning for inherently distinctive marks furthered the purposes of the
Lanham Act, i.e., preventing deception and unfair competition. 79 The
Court found that adding a secondary meaning requirement could have
anticompetitive effects, which might create particular burdens on the
start-up of small companies.80
c. Concurring Opinions
81
Justice Thomas relied not on adjacent sections of the Lanham Act
but solely on the language of section 43(a) before amended.8 2 At com-
mon law arbitrary, fanciful and suggestive marks were presumed to rep-
resent the source of a product. The first user could sue a second
without having to demonstrate that the mark in fact represented the
product's source.
8 3
Trade dress at common law seemed incapable of being inherently
distinctive making secondary meaning a requirement for protection. 4
Over time judges learned that packaging can be as arbitrary or fanciful
as a word or symbol. Courts recognized that trade dress could serve as a
representation or designation of source under section 43(a).8 5 There-
fore, secondary meaning was no longer necessary.
8 6
77. Id. at 2759.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2760.
80. Id. at 2761.
81. Justice Stevens concentrated on the transformation of meaning that Section 43(a)
has experienced in the past decades. Id. at 2761 (Stevens, J., concurring). In the past,
false designation of origin meant exclusively a misrepresentation of geographic origin.
False description or representation encompassed two kinds of wrongs, false advertising
and passing off. The passing off claim contained an element of secondary meaning. Id. at
2762.
Justice Stevens discussed how the courts of appeal have expanded the categories to
include misrepresentation of the origin of manufacture. Id. at 2762-63. The expansion
was unsupported by the Act's language, but Justice Stevens believed it furthered the Act's
general purposes. Id at 2764. Congress had accepted the expansion by broadening
§ 43(a) to include a likelihood of consumer confusion test. Id Justice Stevens concurred
with the majority decision because stare decisis persuaded him that secondary meaning
need not be shown. Id. at 2765-66.
82. Id. at 2766-67 (Thomas, J., concurring).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2767.
86. Id. at 2761 (Scalia, J., concurring) (Justice Scalia wrote a separate note to voice his
complete agreement with Justice Thomas's explanation as to how the language of 43(a)
1993]
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B. Analysis
1. Prior Tenth Circuit Tests
The Tenth Circuit has decided few cases in the area of trade dress
since its first trade dress decision in 1985.87 The court held that alpha-
numeric markings on the top of a wellhead were descriptive and, there-
fore, not entitled to trade dress protection. 88 The opinion suggested,
but did not decide, that secondary meaning would not be necessary for
inherently distinctive trade dress.89 The Tenth Circuit's next opinion
contained a footnote stating that secondary meaning might not be nec-
essary for inherently distinctive dress, but expressly declined to decide
the matter.9 0
The most recent Tenth Circuit case, Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark
Cards, Inc.-,° articulated a trade dress test that required the plaintiff to
establish an acquired secondary meaning for trade dress protection.
9 2
The issue that was appealed did not involve secondary meaning; how-
ever, the court did not as before include a caveat footnote stating that
the issue of secondary meaning was undecided.9 3 Any uncertainty in the
Tenth Circuit's use of secondary meaning for distinctive dress vanished
with the Two Pesos decision.
2. Impact of Two Pesos
Two Pesos brought not only uniformity to this area, but also some
confusion. The Supreme Court did not clarify whether the removal of
the secondary meaning requirement brought trade dress squarely within
the established law of trademarks, or if it will continue as a separate
concept. The Court did not state whether trade dress could now be reg-
istered if a court finds the trade dress inherently distinctive. Addition-
ally, the Court did not indicate whether secondary meaning had
applicability in other prongs of the test, such as likelihood of confusion.
The majority opinion relied on the entire Lanham Act to delete the
need for secondary meaning with inherently distinctive trade dress. In
doing so, the Court ignored the structure and organization of the stat-
ute. Section 43(a) embodies an alternative for protection of unregis-
tered marks, words, and symbols.94 The Court compared Section 43(a)
with Sections 1 and 2 of the Lanham Act which specifically apply to reg-
istered marks. The Court did not clarify if the test that allows for pro-
tection of trade dress also determines if the dress becomes a registered
mark. Instead of reverting to well-established trademark law, the
and its common-law derivation are broad enough to embrace inherently distinctive trade
dress.).
87. J.M. Huber Corp. v. Lowery Wellheads, Inc., 778 F.2d 1467 (10th Cir. 1985).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1470.
90. Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 517 n.2 (10th Cir. 1987).
91. 846 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1988).
92. Id. at 1271.
93. Id
94. Duven, supra note 31, at 159.
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Supreme Court should have distinguished trademark law from trade
dress law. Trade dress, unlike trademarks, encompasses the entire look
of a product requiring consideration of more factors than does trade-
mark law. By paralleling the sections, the Court implied that trade dress
may be entitled to registration.
The term "secondary meaning" does not exist in the text of the
statute relating to registered or non-registered marks. Section 2 articu-
lates an exception for marks used by the applicant which have become
distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce. 9 5 Courts created sec-
ondary meaning as a way to differentiate between descriptive marks and
arbitrary or fanciful marks. 96 The purpose of Section 2 is to distinguish
between the marks the Trademark Office registers and does not register.
In this decision, the Court implied Section 2 applies to trade dress pro-
tection. Thus, trade dress appears to be registerable whether or not the
Court intended that result.
9 7
The Court did not discuss the likelihood of confusion prong of the
test as it was not appealled. 98 Through the Lanham Act Congress codi-
fied the common law provisions of trademark and unfair competition. 9 9
Congress articulated that the purpose for the law was to prevent the
likelihood of confusion and consumer deception. This language ap-
pears in both Section 1 and Section 43(a).10 0 Secondary meaning may
be helpful in determining the third prong of proving likelihood to con-
fuse consumers, the heart of the Lanham Act. Secondary meaning exists
when a consumer associates a name, symbol or package appearance with
a particular source.'0 1 Confusion occurs when another manufacturer
replicates that image. Without an association between a product and its
producer, the consumer cannot be confused as to the source of the
product. Proving the existence of an association establishes a prima fa-
cie case of a likelihood of confusion. An inherently distinctive product
does not necessarily have the association to a particular source. Courts
recognize that the factors used to determine likelihood of confusion are
not exclusive. 10 2 Secondary meaning is a potentially probative way to
determine likelihood of confusion. Although the Court removed the ne-
cessity of showing secondary meaning for the second prong of the trade
dress test, that does not preclude using secondary meaning for deter-
mining the third prong-likelihood of consumer confusion.
95. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1988).
96. See Charcoal Steak House of Charlotte, Inc. v. Staley, 139 S.E.2d 185 (N.C. 1964).
97. Some types of containers and packaging have acquired registered status. See Ex
parte Haig & Haig Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 229 (1958). However, the concept of trade
dress encompasses a more intangible idea of overall visual effect as well as the products
packaging. Julius Lunsford, The Protection of Packages and Containers, 56 TRADEMARK REP.
567 (1966) (discussing whether overall image is afforded registration).
98. Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2758.
99. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 55-56.
100. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1152 (1988).
101. Litman, supra note 34, at 79.
102. Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1986); see RE-
STATEMENT OF TORTS § 729 (1938).
1993]
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Justice Thomas correctly noted that the Court relied on common
ground between the sections of the Act without stating a reason for such
a holding. Such an approach seems more in tune with the meaning of
the Lanham Act. By focusing on common law reasons for Section 43(a),
he did not parallel trade dress with trademarks. This analysis precludes
a possibility of registration for trade dress.
C. Conclusion
The Court opened a new door for plaintiffs looking for trade dress
protection. Under this decision, registration of trade dress is possible.
The complexity likely to result from trying to register all the factors of
trade dress, however, makes the proposition unworkable. By pulling the
unfair competition claim of trade dress into the arena of trademarks, the
Court made trade dress identical to trademarks, when in reality, differ-
ences exist. Discord still exists among the circuits as to how a plaintiff
proves functionality10 3 and likelihood of confusion.' 0 4 The Court de-
cided only one aspect of the trade dress infringement claim, leaving the
more controversial prongs of functionality and consumer confusion
undecided.
III. EXPANSION OF THE DuTy OF CANDOR IN A PATENT REEXAMINATION
PROCEEDING
No major substantive changes have occurred in patent law since the
1966 Supreme Court decision in Graham v. John Deere Co. 105 where the
Court added a new prong to the patentability test. The procedures
available to challenge patent validity, however, have changed. A patent
challenger can now request a patent reexamination. 10 6 Implicit in any
patent proceeding is the element of candor and good faith. The Tenth
Circuit, in Ball Corp. v. Xidex Corp. , 17 broadened the duty of good faith
to the reexamination requester rather than traditionally limiting it to the
patent defender.' 0 8 The court, however, did not establish procedures
to make that extension meaningful, such as expanding the requester's
participation.
A. Background
After the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) issues a patent to a
successful applicant, the patent can be altered in only two ways. First, if
the PTO discovers a patent is wholly or partially inoperative through
error without any deception, the Commissioner may reissue the patent
in accordance with the amended application. 10 9 Second, now Chapter
103. Dumas, supra note 40, at 471.
104. Allen, supra note 44, at 321-22.
105. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
106. 35 U.S.C. § 302 (1988).
107. 967 F.2d 1440 (10th Cir. 1992).
108. Id.
109. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1988).
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30 of the Patent Act allows any person to file a reexamination request at
any time to challenge the validity of the patent."l 0
Patent reexamination procedures"' provide an additional forum
besides federal district court to determine the validity of patents." 
2
Several problems exist for a patent attorney practicing in federal court.
Litigation is extremely expensive in a patent case due to the traditional
use of several experts," l3 and the judge and jury in federal court usually
lack the expertise in the pertinent technology.1 4 A reexamination pro-
ceeding, however, utilizes the technical expertise of PTO examiners,
does not allow discovery or witnesses, and is less expensive than
litigation. 15
The procedure for reexamination begins with a request by any per-
son, including the patent owner, to the PTO and payment of a $2,000
fee." 6 The scope of the reexamination focuses primarily on issues
based upon previous patents or printed publications describing prior
art."l 7 It excludes other important issues of patentability such as patent
misuse, inequitable conduct making a patent unenforceable, inadequacy
of disclosure and fraud on the PTO." 8 A federal court must decide if
these defects exist.
After receipt of the request, the Commissioner determines whether
a substantial new question of patentability exists.~1 9 If the Commis-
sioner decides that the evidence does not raise a question of patentabil-
ity, the decision is final and not appealable. 120 If the Commissioner
agrees with the patent challenger that an issue of patentability exists, a
reexamination is ordered. ' 2 The patent owner then has two months to
file a statement regarding the issues raised in the request for reexamina-
tion.' 2 2 The reexamination requester has an opportunity to file a reply
to the owner's statement. 123 However, if the owner does not file a re-
sponse, the requester may not file a reply and the requester's participa-
tion in the reexamination is ended. 12 4 The only way for a challenger to
110. Id. § 302.
111. Pub. L. No. 96-517 § 1, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1988)).
112. George N. Neff, Patent Reexamination- Valuable, But Flawed: Recommendations for
Change, 68J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 575 (1986).
113. Id.
114. Id. This has somewhat been removed with the creation of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit (CAFC). The Federal Court Improvement Act of 1982 withdrew
patent jurisdiction from the twelve regional courts of appeals and granted exclusive juris-
diction to the CAFC. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295
(1988)).
115. Neff, supra note 112, at 576.
116. 35 U.S.C. § 302 (1988); MANUAL OF PAT'ENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2215 (5th
ed. 1983) [hereinafter MPEP].
117. 35 U.S.C. § 301 (1988).
118. Neff, supra note 112, at 576-77.
119. 35 U.S.C. § 303 (1988).
120. Id. Upon this finding a refund of $1,500 is given to the patent reexamination
requester. MPEP, supra note 116, § 2215.
121. 35 U.S.C. § 304 (1988).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Neff, supra note 112, at 578.
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make additional arguments is to file another reexamination request after
paying another $2,000.125
Patents extend a valuable monopoly to the patent owner. Privi-
leged monopolies constitute an anomaly in our economy founded on
the concept of free enterprise.' 2 6 Due to this advantage, public interest"
demands that patent monopolies not be granted through fraudulent or
inequitable conduct.' 2 7 Those with applications pending with the PT6
have an uncompromising duty to report all facts concerning possible
fraud or inequity.12 8 The purpose for this uncompromising duty is due
to the ex parte nature of a patent application or reexamination proceed-
ing.129 Courts do not view this as a true adversarial proceeding. ' 30 The
PTO does not have full research facilities nor were such facilities in-
tended by Congress.' 3 ' In examining applications, the PTO relies heav-
ily upon the prior art references cited in the application.' 3 2
Section 1.555 of the Code of Federal Regulations specifically calls
for a duty of candor and good faith for individuals brought before the
PTO for a reexamination hearing.13 3 The language of the regulation
states that the duty of disclosure applies to "the patent owner, each at-
torney or agent who represents the patent owner, and every other indi-
vidual who is substantially involved on behalf of the patent owner." 13
4
The regulation does not mention a duty of candor for the reexamination
requester, only the defender.
To find that someone has breached the duty of candor, the court
looks for three elements. First, the breacher must have intended the
breaching act through deliberate concealment, falsehoods in petitions,
misrepresentations, or false affidavits.' 3 5 Some courts have relaxed the
requirement of intent, holding unintentional misrepresentation as ade-
125. Id.
126. S. William Cochran, Historical Review of Fraud in Patent Procurement: The Standards
and Procedures for Doing Business Before the Patent Office, 52J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 71 (1970).
127. Id.
128. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806, 818 (1945).
129. Michael J. Ram, Patent Fraud- A New Defense?, 54 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 363, 373
(1972).
130. See Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Davis-Edwards Parmacal Corp., 443 F.2d 867 (2d Cir.
1971). Judge Mansfield disagreed with this proposition. He stated that in patent applica-
tion prosecutions, unlike most ex parte proceedings, the examiners act like adversaries
representing the general public. Id. at 885 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
131. See Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc., 428 F.2d 555, 564 (5th Cir.
1970).
132. Id. The Patent Examiner is not limited to the references cited by the patent appli-
cant and is obligated to fully search the references in the field. Ram, supra note 129, at 374
(quoting L. AMDUR, PATENT OFFICE RULES AND PRACTICE 104 (1959)).
133. 37 C.F.R. § 1.555 (1991). The PTO has recently revised the regulation to parallel
the duty of disclosure in patent application proceedings. Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg.
2021-36 (1992) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.555). The type of information required to
be disclosed at a patent reexamination has changed, but the regulation still does not define
who must disclose this information. Id. The patent requester again is noticeably left out
of the statutory change.
134. Id. at 2036.
135. Ram, supra note 129, at 371.
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quate evidence of lack of candor.' 3 6 Second, the fraudulent misrepre-
sentations must be material in granting the patent.' 3 7 This is
determined objectively by the court or PTO.' 3 8 Courts consider both
intent and materiality together to determine inequitable conduct.' 3 9 A
higher level of materiality requires a lower level of intent. 140 Finally, the
examiner must have relied on the misrepresentations.'
4 1
The courts have lacked consistentcy in determining whether a
breach of the duty of candor exists. In Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chem-
tronics, Inc., 142 the Fifth Circuit concentrated on the intent of the parties.
Due to intentional concealment by the patent owner, the court invali-
dated the patent.' 43 The Federal District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California found a breach of the duty of candor upon a showing
of gross negligence. 144 Moreover, the consequences of inequitable con-
duct by a reexamination requester have not been defined in any case.
The Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks has suggested inequita-
ble conduct by the requester would not vacate the reexamination pro-
ceeding.' 4 5  The Commissioner stated a patent owner has an
opportunity to correct any misstatements of facts. 14 6 The Tenth Circuit
did not define requisite level of intent and expanded the duty of candor
to patent requesters without discussing the consequences of a
breach. 147
B. Ball Corp. v. Xidex Corp.
148
1. Facts
Ball Corporation (Ball) holds the Roller patent' 49 for a method of
136. Id. at 372. The District Court of Northern California stated that "a finding of
gross negligence will warrant a holding of inequitable conduct if the undisclosed or mis-
stated information meets the objective 'but for' test of materiality." Micro Motion, Inc. v.
Exac Corp., 686 F. Supp. 789, 796 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
137. Ram, supra note 129, at 372.
138. See generally Allen Archery, Inc. v. Browning Mfg. Co., 819 F.2d 1087 (Fed. Cir.
1987); Akzo N.V. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 808 F.2d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1986),
cert. denied 482 U.S. 909 (1987); Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter Co., 740 F.2d 1529 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
139. Akzo N.V, 808 F.2d at 1481.
140. Id. at 1481-82. Courts generally recognize four levels of materiality: (1) there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider it important in deciding
patentability; (2) the information might reasonably affect the examiner's decision to issue a
patent; (3) the examiner would have rejected the claims even though the claims were pat-
entable; and (4) the information in fact renders the claims unpatentable. Micro Motion,
Inc. v. Exac Corp., 686 F. Supp. 789, 796 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
141. Akzo N. ., 808 F.2d at 1481.
142. 428 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1970).
143. Id. at 566.
144. Micro Motion, 686 F. Supp. at 789.
145. In re Burkner, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1630, 1633 (1987).
146. Id.
147. Ball Corp. v. Xidex Corp., 967 F.2d 1440 (10th Cir. 1992)[hereinafter Ball I]
(references to Ball Corp. v. Xidex Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1470 (D. Colo. 1988) are hereinaf-
ter Ball 1).
148. Id.
149. United States Patent No. 3,778,308 was issued to inventors Kent G. Roller,
George H. Alhorn and Richard E. Brown in December of 1973. Id.
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lubricating magnetic storage devices such as computer memory disks,
drums and tapes. The Roller patent describes "the application of a lu-
bricant known as perfluoralkyl polyether (PFA) over a substrate of mag-
netic material." 1 50 Xidex Corporation (Xidex) "has used PFA as a
lubricant since 1978 without a license from Ball."'' Xidex disputed
whether the Roller patent covered use of PFA by Xidex. Xidex argued
that the thickness of the PFA coating was the material element of the
process and that the Roller patent only covered products falling within
the thickness range described in the patent. 152 Ball broadly defined its
patent as simply PFA applied to storage devices in a thin coating regard-
less of a specific thickness.'
53
In 1986, Ball filed a patent infringement suit before the Colorado
Federal District Court against Xidex claiming the Xidex disks fell within
the thickness specifications. 154 Xidex asked the trial court to declare
certain materials confidential for purposes of the patent infringement
claim and to keep certain sales reports under the court's protective or-
der. 155 After substantial discovery in the patent infringement case,
Xidex instituted a reexamination proceeding in the PTO claiming the
Roller patent was obvious in light of prior art.15 6 The patent examiner
agreed with Xidex and invalidated certain claims of the patent. 15 7 Ball
brought a subsequent suit claiming Xidex damaged the company by
making false statements and withholding material evidence during the
reexamination proceeding.158 Ball also argued that Xidex, the reexami-
nation requester, breached its duty of candor and good faith to the
PTO. Ball stated the standard of intent was only gross negligence.
15 9
The trial court found that Mr. Kujawa, Xidex' attorney, did not act
maliciously and had a reasonable belief regarding the materiality of the
thickness specifications.' 60 Mr. Kujawa's actions did not rise to the level
of negligence. Since Ball failed to prove the causation element of the
claimed torts, the court dismissed all of Ball's claims.'
6 '
2. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit expanded the responsibilities of a patent reex-
amination requester without determining what level of intent constitutes
a breach. The court stated that the uncompromising duty of candor de-
scribed in section 1.555 requires a patent owner, attorney or agent of








158. Ball 1, 705 F. Supp. 1470, 1471 (D. Colo. 1988).
159. Ball 11, 967 F.2d at 1445.
160. Id. at 1443. The trial court also determined Xidex was entitled to a qualified im-
munity under the First Amendment for defamatory statements made before the PTO. Ball
I, 705 F. Supp. at 1472.
161. Ball I, 967 F.2d at 1443.
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the patent owner to bring materials to the attention of the PTO as they
become aware of the information. 162 The court extended the duty of
candor to the reexamination requester as well as the patent defender
even though the statutory language mentions only the patent de-
fender. 163 Implicit with that duty was an element of intent. 164 Mr.
Kujawa had a duty to disclose all evidence material to the determination
of patentability and a duty to correct misrepresentations.' 6 5 In this
case, however, Mr. Kujawa lacked the requisite intent to have breached
his duty to the PTO. 166 The court did not decide what level of intent
was necessary, and simply accepted the trial court's finding that Mr.
Kujawa did not act even negligently.
16 7
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals extended the responsibility of
candor and good faith to the patent reexamination requester. It did not
reach this decision by examining the regulatory language of section
1.555 which applies only to the patent owner, representatives of the
owner and anyone substantially involved on behalf of the patent
owner. 16 8 This extension, however, seems logical. The Supreme Court
imposes a duty of disclosure and candor on all parties involved with the
PTO. 169 An increase in moral responsibility generally benefits all legal
proceedings. However, commentators have suggested more attention
should be focused on technical and economic facts rather than on moral
questions. 1
70
The court did not elaborate on what this duty entails. Although
recognizing that the level of intent was the heart of the issue, 17 1 the
Tenth Circuit failed to reach a conclusion on this important question.
Ball argued that the level of intent should be gross negligence, or at
most recklessness. 172 The court stated that since Mr. Kujawa had a rea-
sonable belief in his statements his conduct did not even rise to the level
of negligence. 17 3 By leaving this question unanswered, the court did
162. Id. at 1447; see 37 C.F.R. § 1.555 (1992).




167. Id. at 1446 n.6. The court also held that the district court erred in holding that
Xidex' statements were protected by a qualified immunity. Id. at 1445. Relying on
Supreme Court precedent, the Tenth Circuit found an absolute immunity for attorneys
against defamation claims. Id. at 1445 (citing Robinson v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 940 F.2d
1369 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1160 (1992)). This immunity, however, does
not extend to allegations of fraud. Id. at 1444.
168. 37 C.F.R. § 1.555 (1992).
169. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806, 818 (1945).
170. Donald S. Chisum, Patent Law and the Presumption of Moral Regularity: A Critical Re-
view of Recent Federal Circuit Decisions on Inequitable Conduct and Willful Infringement, 69 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 27, 28 (1987).
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not decide whether traditional liability principles are applicable to PTO
proceedings.
The Supreme Court described this duty of candor as uncompromis-
ing. 174 The Tenth Circuit stated that the duty applies whenever a par-
ticipant is or becomes aware of any information material to the PTO's
determination of patent validity. Extending this duty to the reexamina-
tion requester places an even higher burden on that individual due to
the ex parte nature of the proceedings. Commentators, however, call
the lack of participation by the requester one of the biggest flaws in the
new procedure. 175 An uncompromising duty of candor falls particularly
heavily on a requester. The only opportunity a requester has to address
the PTO occurs in the initial request, and possibly in a reply, provided
the patent owner files a response. Presently, no procedures exist to
amend or add to a reexamination request. Ball indicates a movement
towards a more interactive role for the requester.
The duty may have little practical effect. In re Burkner176 suggests
the inequitable conduct on the part of a requester has no effect on the
proceeding. The Commissioner would not vacate the reexamination
even after a showing of inequitable conduct, because the patent owner
can correct any misrepresentations during the reexaminaiton proceed-
ing. The Tenth Circuit, however, by extending this duty, probably did
not intend it to be only cosmetic or superficial. By not enumerating pro-
cedures to enforce the duty, it might not be effectively upheld.
The Tenth Circuit only mentioned the test of materiality in deter-
mining whether Mr. Kujawa breached the duty of candor. The opinion
stated: "Mr. Kujawa lacked awareness of the information's materiality,
and he therefore did not have the requisite intent to breach his duty to
the PTO."'177 It appears that the Tenth Circuit used a subjective test for
materiality. This is not sound. Prior case law indicates that the PTO
must determine what is material and what is not. 178 The Federal Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California, in Micro Motion, Inc. v.
Exac Corp. , 179 stated that materiality and intent are intertwined when de-
termining inequitable conduct. The court did not propose that materi-
ality should be measured by an indiviidual's own subjective view.
180 If
courts use a subjective view, a problem with bias arises. The PTO or
courts must decide the objective level of materiality before applying it to
the issue of intent. Although simple negligence and erroneous judg-
ment are insufficient to constitute a breach even when the information is
extremely material, the standard still must remain objective.' 8 1 Here,
174. Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 818.
175. Neff, supra note 112, at 575.
176. 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1630 (1987).
177. Ball 11, 967 F.2d at 1447.
178. See Allen Archery, Inc. v. Browning Mfg. Co., 819 F.2d 1087 (Fed. Cir. 1987);
Akzo N.V. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 808 F.2d 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 482 U.S. 909 (1987); Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter Co., 740 F.2d 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
179. 686 F. Supp. 789 (N.D. Cal. 1987).




Mr. Kujawa's judgment was erroneous, but a subjective determination of
materiality is not the appropriate standard. By sidestepping the issue of
materiality, the Tenth Circuit inadvertently allowed a subjective test to
enter into a materiality analysis, contrary to the general consensus of the
other courts. A subjective test weakens the duty of candor by allowing
possible breaches to be explained away simply because the attorney did
not believe the information was material.
D. Conclusion
Extending responsibility to the reexamintion requester is a step in
the direction of increasing ethical behavior by attorneys. Moral respon-
sibility is a desired trait. In practice, however, this responsibility could
stifle the use of a beneficial new patent procedure. Without linking ex-
panded participation in the reexamination proceeding with expanded
responsibility, the rule loses power. Allowing a subjective test of materi-
ality also eliminates some benefits from this rule.
IV. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COSTS: A POSSIBLE ACTUAL DAMAGE
FIGURE FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
Proving actual damages for copyright infringement is very difficult
and often results in the copyright owner settling for statutory damages.
In Harris Marketing Research v. Marshall Marketing and Communications,1
8 2
the Tenth Circuit enumerated an alternative to proving actual damages:
granting recovery for the development cost of a computer program.
The absence of case law supporting this type of recovery suggests that
attorneys often fail to ask for these damages.
A. Background
The 1976 Copyright Act18 3 lists the remedies available for copy-
right infringement. The purposes for awarding these damages include
compensating the copyright owner for losses due to the infringement
and preventing unjust enrichment for the copyright infringer. 184 Sec-
tion 504(a) states an infringer of a copyright is liable for the copyright
owner's actual damages and any additional profits of the infringer or
statutory damages. 185 The 1976 Act alleviated conflict between the cir-
cuits as to the meaning of actual damages. Under the 1909 Act it was
unclear whether the measure of actual damages included profits or if
profit recovery was an alternative remedy. 18 6 The 1976 Act balanced
the deterrent and compensatory approach by allowing the copyright
182. 948 F.2d 1518 (10th Cir. 1991).
183. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988).
184. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 161 (1976), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5777.
185. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) (1988).
186. Compare Thomas Wilson & Co. v. IrvingJ. Dorfman Co., Inc., 433 F.2d 409 (2d
Cir. 1907), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 977 (1971) (cumulative remedies) with Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Prod., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977) (alternative
remedies).
19931
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owner to recover actual damages and any profits not taken into account
in determining the actual damages.' 8 7 Section 504(b) describes the
meaning of actual damages by explaining the procedure of proving the
infringer's profits.' 8 8 Congress gave copyright owners a choice of
whether to seek statutory damages.' 8 9 In electing statutory damages,
the copyright owner can recover without having to prove economic
harm. 190 Courts infer harm from the demonstration of a copyright in-
fringement and have discretion to increase the award for any infringe-
ment committed willfully to a sum of not more than $100,000.191 The
release from having to prove actual damages makes this a very attractive
alternative. '
9 2
The complexity of determining copyright infringement and appro-
priate damages increases in the area of computers and computer
software. In 1980, Congress amended the 1976 Copyright Act to in-
clude computers in the general definition section of the Act. 19 This
firmly placed computers and their programs within the realm of copy-
right protection.' 94 Infringement of a computer program occurs when
any of the exclusive rights specified in section 106 of the Act are vio-
lated. 195 Simply using a computer program also may constitute in-
fringement. 196 Many computer software developers choose statutory
187. GoLDSTEIN, supra note 3, at 707.
188. The statute provides:
The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by him or
her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are attrib-
utable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual
damages. In establishing the infringer's profits, the copyright owner is required
to present proof only of the infringer's gross revenue, and the infringer is re-
quired to prove his or her deductible expenses and the elements of profit attribu-
table to factors other than the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1988).
189. Id. § 504(c) (defining statutory damages as a range from not less than $500 to
more than $20,000, as the court considers just).
190. ALLAN LATMAN, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAw 283 (William F. Patry ed., 6th ed.
1986).
191. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).
192. LATMAN, supra note 190, at 283.
193. Pub. L. No. 96-517 § 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (Act of Dec. 12, 1980).
194. Whelan Assoc., Inc. v.Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
195. Section 106 states:
[Tihe owner of a copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to
authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
196. L.J. KNUTrEN, COMPUTER SOFTWARE § 2.07 (1989); see Bly v. Banbury Books, Inc.,
638 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
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damages when they discover infringement 9 7 for the following reasons:
(1) proving actual damages is difficult; (2) infringers can easily escape
detection; and (3) pursuing an intellectual property case is very
expensive. 1 9 8
Actual damage can be demonstrated in a variety of ways. The
Copyright Act did not specifically define the nature of actual dam-
ages. 199 This often requires a court to estimate infringement dam-
ages. 20 0 Nevertheless, uncertainty about and a need to estimate
damages does not prevent recovery.20 1 Courts often use lost sales as a
basis for determining damages for copyright infringement.2 0 2 Courts
utilize this measure when an infringer directly 'competes with the copy-
right owner.2 0 3 In theory, the infringer displaced sales of the copyright
owner and, therefore, must replace the lost sales. 2° 4 Conversely, if an
infringer indirectly competes with the owner, the court applies a reason-
able royalty rate.20 5 A reasonable royalty usually equals a previously
granted license rate.2 0 6 Finally, if the copyright owner has not previ-
ously licensed the copyright, the market value of the copyright at the
time of the infringement becomes the measure of damages.
20 7
The heart of calculating damages focuses on the extent that the
market value of the copyright has been injured or destroyed by the in-
fringement. 20 8 Courts look at indirect evidence bearing on the value
because of the difficulty in making such a determination. 20 9 The owner
of the intellectual property may testify as to its intrinsic value. 210 If a
special value endows the work with greater than market value, a court
looks at the nature of the work, its particular utility to the plaintiff and
whether the work can be reproduced.
2 1'
1. Recovery of Development Costs
Few cases allow research and development costs as a form of actual
damages. Courts, however, do not appear reluctant to grant this type of
recovery. The absence of cases granting research and development
costs is most likely connected to an absence of attorneys requesting
them.
197. KNUTrEN, supra note 196, § 2.07[5][d].
198. PETER B. MAGGS ET AL., COMPUTER LAw 413 (1992).
199. 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.02 (1992).
200. Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1947).
201. LATMAN, supra note 190, at 283.
202. Stevens Linen Assoc. v. Mastercraft Corp., 656 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1981).
203. GoLsTEIN, supra note 3, at 707.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See Cream Records, Inc. v.Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 754 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1985).
207. See NIMMER, supra note 199, § 14.02, at 14-8 n.3. Nimmer notes that if the plain-
tiff's work had been infringed by another work prior to the defendant's infringement, the
damages would be reduced. This tends to reduce the value of the copyright at the time of
the defendant's infringement.
208. Fitzgerald Pub. Co. v. Baylor Pub. Co., Inc., 807 F.2d 1110, 1118 (2d Cir. 1986).
209. NIMMER, supra note 199, at § 14.02[A].
210. Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 369 (9th Cir. 1947).
211. NIMMER, supra note 199, at 14.02[A].
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In American Fabrics Co. v. Lace Art, Inc. ,212 the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York hinted at the availability of
research and development costs as an appropriate remedy. The court
denied American Fabrics a preliminary injunction that would prevent
Lace Art from selling its lace patterns due to an insufficient showing of
irreparable harm. 2 13 American Fabrics complained that their high de-
velopment costs afforded the copier an opportunity to undersell
them. 2 14 The court found no reason why monetary damages would not
serve as an adequate remedy for. these costs; development costs pro-
vided a basis for monetary damages.
2 15
More recently, the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennslyvania mentioned recovery of development costs for dam-
ages in a footnote.2 1 6 The opinion stated that "a split produces two
additional 3090 microcode copies . . . for which IBM may recover addi-
tional development costs and profits."'2 17 Finally, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana allowed development
costs in Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc. 2 18 In calculat-
ing actual damages for copyright infringement, the court gave an award
that included costs to convert the owner's program into a program com-
patible with a personal computer.2 19 The Tenth Circuit agreed that re-
search and development costs provide an additional mode of recovery
for copyright infringement in Harris Market Research v. Marshall Marketing
and Communications, Inc.
2 20




Harris Marketing (Harris) developed a customized software pro-
gram for Marshall Marketing and Communications (Marshall) to assimi-
late marketing information for television and radio stations for easier
analysis. Marshall and Harris entered into a license and operating
agreement (License Agreement) which allowed Marshall to sublicense
the software to the individual stations.2 2 2 The License Agreement re-
quired Marshall to pay Harris licensing and processing fees for use of
the software. 22 3 With this agreement, "Harris Market expected to re-
212. 291 F. Supp. 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
213. Id. at 592.
214. Id. at 591-92.
215. Id.
216. Allen-Myland, Inc. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 746 F. Supp. 520, 547
n.39 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
217. Id.
218. 785 F. Supp. 576 (E.D. La. 1991).
219. Id. at 584.
220. 948 F.2d 1518 (10th Cir. 1991).
221. Id.




trieve license fees over seven years to amortize its investment .... -224
Marshall failed to make all scheduled payments prompting Harris to
send a notice of intent to terminate the License Agreement. 22 5 After
Marshall orally agreed to cure the payment default, Harris sent another
letter agreeing to hold the termination at abeyance if Marshall met cer-
tain conditions. Harris contended Marshall did not meet the conditions
and began contacting the television stations directly for payment of the
license fee. Harris then became concerned when it did not immediately
receive copies of the sublicense agreements on which the payment
schedule for Marshall was based. 22 6 After receiving the agreements,
Harris concluded it had not billed Marshall correctly so Harris sent an-
other notice of termination and refused to undertake any new perform-
ance under the License Agreement.
22 7
Harris brought an action for breach of the License Agreement and
copyright infringement in Kansas District Court. 22 8 Marshall counter-
claimed for breach of the License Agreement, misappropriation of pro-
prietary information, interference with sublicense agreements, and
malicious prosecution for the copyright infringement claim. Following a
trial, a jury returned a special verdict finding Marshall liable for breach
of the License Agreement and copyright infringement. 2 29 The jury
found Harris liable for breach of the License Agreement, misappropria-
tion of proprietary information, interference with sublicense agree-
ments, and malicious prosecution for the copyright infringement
claim. 23 0 This discussion focuses on whether the trial court abused its
discretion by admitting Harris' development costs as proof of actual
damages.
2. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit held the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting evidence of Harris's development costs. 23 ' These damages
are recoverable as copyright damages. The jury instruction explaining
copyright damages stated that "the law allows a successful plaintiff to
recover actual damages suffered as a result of the infringement including
unrecovered costs and lost profits." 23 2 Marshall did not object to this jury
instruction.
The court explained that Harris "expected to retrieve license fees
over seven years to amortize its investment but was unable to recover its
development CoStS." ' 23 3 The trial court correctly admitted the develop-
224. Id. at 1524.
225. Id. at 1521.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Harris Mkt. Research v. Marshall Mktg. & Communications, Inc., No. CIV.A.86-
2491-S, 1990 WL 81044 (D. Kan. May 1, 1990).
229. Id. at 1.
230. Id.
231. Harris Mkt. Research, 948 F.2d at 1524.
232. Id. (emphasis in original).
233. Id.
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ment cost amount. Reluctant to overturn evidentiary rulings of the trial




The most obvious effect of Harris Market Research is in the enumera-
tion of an additional way to prove actual damages in a computer copy-
right action. Courts have acknowledged this measure of remedy in
several other cases but not so clearly as in Harris Market Research.23 5 The
computer industry definitely benefits from this decision due to the high
costs associated with developing both computers and software. Other
industries, however, also may rely more on this form of actual damages.
Allowing recovery for these damages furthers the purposes of enforcing
copyright infringement. The damages compensate the individual for
costs not taken into account when the court grants recovery of profits,
and enhanced damages effectively deter infringers.
A problem with the court's decision occurs in the articulation of the
remedy. The trial court admitted a summary of costs associated with
developing the computer program.2 3 6 Marshall objected to introduc-
tion of the summary of costs, but the trial court overruled the objection
without any discussion. 23 7 The Tenth Circuit seems to authorize these
damages without discussion2 38 and without authority for this proposi-
tion. The court then focused on Jury Instruction 12 noting that it con-
tained a provision for unrecovered costs. Marshall did not object to that
specific instruction. 23 9 The court emphasized that fact, yet did not dis-
cuss that Marshall previously objected at the time the trial court admit-
ted the evidence. Instead of firmly stating that Harris could recover
development costs, the court ties the admittance to the ommission of
objection on the part of Marshall. In doing so, the assurance of the rem-
edy becomes clouded. Will an objection to an instruction on develop-
ment cost damages remove the figure from the actual damages
calculation? The Tenth Circuit did not clarify this issue.
Harris Market Research demonstrates what the Tenth Circuit requires
to grant development costs as damages. Harris introduced a summary
of the costs associated with developing that specific computer pro-
gram.240 The court then found that Harris was unable to recoup its de-
velopment costs by retrieving license fees over several years. 2 4 1 Hence,
the court will require very clear and precise evidence of unrecovered
costs before granting this form of damage. This decision encourages
industries to undertake costly advances in technology. The assurance of
234. Id.
235. See supra notes 208-16 and accompanying text.
236. Harris Mkt. Research, 948 F.2d at 1523.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1524 (These damages are recoverable as copyright damages.).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1523.
241. Id. at 1524.
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recovery for these costs removes some of the risks involved in using
initiative.
Although the case at first glance appears to be of little importance,
it demonstrates to practitioners the need to ask the court for unusual
damages, especially in the area of copyright infringement where actual
damages are not defined. Creativity is not always common in the prac-
tice of law. This case suggests that the Tenth Circuit will allow unique
damages for copyright infringement. However, it is not clear what effect
an objection to those damages will have on the court's decision to grant
or deny them.
V. CONCLUSION
The intellectual property area has exploded to encompass a wide
variety of areas. The three decisions discussed in this survey demon-
strate some of the newest developments in intellectual property law.
First, distinctive trade dress uniformly does not require secondary
meaning for statutory protection. Second, patent reexamination, an ad-
ditional way to challange patent validity, has extended the duties and
responsibilities to the patent defender but also to the patent challenger.
Third, a copyright owner can recover development costs from a copy-
right infringer.
For each decision that resolves an issue, more unanswered ques-
tions arise. These cases illustrate not only what courts have decided in
these new areas but also what courts will need to decide in the future.
Two prongs of the trade dress test still require definition. Additional
procedures are needed to increase the usefulness of patent reexamina-
tions. While copyright damages continue to evolve, the courts need to
supply some concrete guidelines as to what measure of damages will be
allowed. With an expansion of intellectual property rights comes a cor-
responding need for the courts and legislature to define those rights.
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